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Abstract One of the key challenges in public safety
networks is to ensure a high level of information quality
(IQ) during disaster response. Since many evaluation
reports on disaster response efforts have revealed instances
of poor IQ, both academics and practitioners are in search
of information architectures that assure IQ. This article
focuses on the hurdles and opportunities for IQ assurance
via information architectures. Drawing on two opposing
coordination approaches, hierarchical versus netcentric, we
suggest adopting a hybrid, information orchestration-based
approach for assuring IQ. While hierarchical coordination
approaches result in architectures dictating predefined
information flows dependent on structures and procedures,
netcentric information coordination emphasizes the need
for individual self-synchronization driven by events.
Even though both architectures have their strengths
and weaknesses depending on several contingencies, both
include characteristics that hamper IQ assurance for relief
workers. Information orchestration offers the middle
ground between hierarchical and netcentric approaches and
defined as a heterarchical form of information coordination
consisting of a specific set of roles and capabilities related
to the collection, enrichment, and dissemination of high-
quality information. Capabilities that need to be developed
according to the information orchestration approach con-
stitute a research agenda.
Keywords Disaster management  Information quality 
Netcentric orchestration  Public safety networks
1 Introduction
In 2005, an advisory committee to the Dutch Ministry of
Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations concluded that
relief workers in public safety networks (i.e., police offi-
cers, firemen, and ambulance personnel) are too often
confronted with two types of problems during multi-agency
disaster management: (1) having limited access to infor-
mation in the network and (2) a lack of information sharing
amongst the autonomous relief agencies (ACIR 2005).
Three years later, the ‘‘All Hands on Deck’’ workshop
including top level government officials and commanders
of multiple relief agencies concluded that especially the
coordination of information sharing is still a major problem
in the Netherlands (ASE 2008). This is not only a problem
for relief workers in the Netherlands. Evaluation studies on
disaster management efforts around the globe have repor-
ted similar issues (e.g., Dawes et al. 2004; Chen et al.
2008). For instance, The National Institute of Standards
and Technology (National Institute of Standards and
Technology 2005) concluded that ‘‘a preponderance of
evidence indicates that emergency responder lives were
likely lost at the World Trade Center resulting from the
lack of timely information sharing between agencies’’. In
the response to the 2004 Tsunami, ‘‘mostly, the informa-
tion was incomplete, yet conclusions had to be drawn
immediately’’ (Samarajiva 2005). ‘‘During the response to
Hurricane Katrina, the federal government lacked the
timely, accurate, and relevant ground-truth information
necessary to evaluate which critical infrastructures
were damaged, inoperative, or both’’ (Townsend 2006).
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These examples of poor information quality (IQ) might just
be a tip of the iceberg when considering that statistics
report that in 2007, 414 natural disasters were reported
killing 16,847 persons, affecting more than 211 million
others and caused over 74.9 US$ billion in economic
damages (Scheuren et al. 2008). Compared with other
problems in disaster management such as political deci-
sion-making (Boin et al. 2005), bounded human cognition
(Stern 2001), and uncertainty (Argote 1982), the occur-
rence and prevention of information quality problems is ill-
studied.
Comfort and Kapucu (2006) already observed that relief
workers experienced IQ problems, because the systems
used were not able to sufficiently adapt to the changing
environment. Taking this observation as a starting point,
we add that information architectures based on the hierar-
chical command and control paradigm do not leverage
adaptive information coordination capabilities necessary
for assuring IQ in public safety networks. On the other
hand, a steadily increasing body of literature advocates the
concept of Network-Centric Operations (NCO) as alterna-
tive for hierarchical information coordination in public safety
networks. Drawing on the strengths and limitations of both
approaches, we introduce the concept of information orches-
tration as means for leveraging adaptive information coordi-
nation capabilities necessary for IQ assurance. Information
orchestration is broader than simple information sharing, as
orchestration capabilities are influenced by the institutional
structure, organizational responsibilities, and available tech-
nology. Hence, the objective of this article is to add to the
research agenda on information systems for public safety
networks by elaborating on needed capabilities for informa-
tion orchestration prior to and during multi-agency disaster
response.
This article contributes to existing literatures in three
ways. First, it specifies IQ problems during disaster
response efforts, and it also exposes the need to ensure that
information provision and sharing are adapted to changing
circumstances. Second, it elaborates on the strengths and
limitations of two contrary approaches for information
coordination dilemma in public safety networks. Finally,
this article presents an information orchestration frame-
work that constitutes capabilities needed for IQ assurance
as avenues for a research agenda.
This article proceeds by elaborating on what we know
about IQ problems during disaster response and the coor-
dination of information under such circumstances. Next,
we discuss what we need to know and elaborate on the
information orchestration concept as means for assuring
IQ. This article concludes with a research agenda on
which steps we need to undertake to advance information
coordination and presents some questions for further
research.
2 Disaster management and poor information quality
Information quality (IQ) is not a new concept in infor-
mation systems research and has been studied extensively
(e.g., Miller 1996). What is new in the past decade is the
explosion in the quantity of information and the
increasing reliance by most segments of society on that
information (Ballou et al. 2004). IQ is a pervasive con-
cept and a key antecedent in the information systems
success (Delone and McLean 1992). The concept of IQ
has been studied by multiple scholars (e.g., Strong et al.
1997; Miller 1996; Ballou and Tayi-Kumar 1999). Con-
sequently, several frameworks have been proposed for
capturing IQ dimensions (e.g., Redman 1995; Wang and
Strong 1996; English 1999), each viewing and treating
this concept differently. Usually, scholars do not define
what IQ is. Instead they prefer to provide a set of IQ
dimensions (or criteria) information should meet. These
criteria can be used as benchmarks for measuring the
effectiveness of information systems and for developing
information architecture arrangements that assure IQ
(Miller 1996). However, the number and type of criteria
for IQ proposed by scholars differs. For instance, Miller
(1996) suggests that IQ has ten dimensions, while Pipino
et al. (2002) differentiate sixteen dimensions. A detailed
overview of dimension can be found in the article by
Strong et al. (1997), who suggest categorization of the
dimensions in order to focus on the development of
arrangements to assure information quality. The proposed
categories are intrinsic, accessibility, contextual, and
representational IQ. Using these categories, the next table
describes some IQ problems pointed out in literature on
disaster response.
Table 1 outlines only a handful of IQ problems
encountered by relief workers during disaster management
efforts. The relative importance of each IQ category
depends on several contingencies during the life cycle of a
disaster in which activities, goals, stakeholder involvement,
and accompanying information need changes. For instance,
in the first hour of disaster management, accessibility of
information is the largest concern, whereas the following
hours pose problems related to the contextual, intrinsic, and
representational characteristics of information. While poor
IQ can be a major problem for relief workers, we treat
information quality issues as symptoms of non-adaptive
information coordination. As discussed by Chen et al.
(2008), multiple inputs can be coordinated during a disaster
including the task flows (tasks and interdependent rela-
tionships), resources, information, decisions (decision
roles, rules, and structures), and responders (relationships,
team-think, group dynamics organizational dynamics).
Because we are primarily interested in improving IQ in the
public safety network, we specifically focus on the
204 Cogn Tech Work (2011) 13:203–216
123
coordination of information, referring to the collection,
analysis, enrichment, and distribution of information in the
network. Considering the types of IQ problems outlined in
table 1, we need to understand the characteristics of the
underlying information coordination architecture that allow
for or prevent the occurrence of these IQ problems.
Accordingly, the next section discusses the hierarchical,
command, and control coordination approach on which
many existing disaster information coordination architec-
tures are based.
3 Hierarchical coordination in public safety networks
3.1 Background
Many of the existing information coordination architec-
tures in public safety networks are based on the hierar-
chical (a.k.a. command and control) coordination approach
(see for instance Bigley and Roberts 2001; Hale 1997;
Mackenzie et al. 2007). This reflects the belief that the
most effective repression operations are carried out under
rigid control, exercised convergent with intra-agency
authority structures. The major strategic decisions are made
at the highest echelons and are filtered down, and more
detail is added as they pass through to the lower echelons
(top-down/bottom-up principle). Throughout this flow of
information, an asymmetry of information load is main-
tained, often resulting in fragmented situation awareness
(cf. Militello et al. 2007). In a hierarchy, the flow of
information is coordinated trough adjacent steps, by con-
trolling and directing information to the higher and sub-
ordinate echelons (Malone et al. 1987). The advantage of
this coordination approach is that the number of interac-
tions and interdependencies between relief workers is often
known and limited since the linkages are based on long-
lasting relationships and procedures. In many public ser-
vice domains, hierarchical coordination was embraced
Table 1 Information quality categories and problems pointed out in previous research
IQ category Example an of IQ problem
Accessibility (e.g., availability) ‘‘On the day of landfall, authoritative reporting from the field was extremely difficult to
obtain ….as a result, local, state, and federal officials were forced to depend on a
variety of conflicting reports from a combination of media, government and private
sources, many of which continued to provide inaccurate or incomplete information
throughout the day, further clouding the understanding of what was occurring in New
Orleans’’ (Townsend 2006).
The 9/11 case shows that access to data across agency lines also needs to be improved
to support interagency coordination (Comfort and Kapucu 2006). ‘‘In some cases,
needed information existed but was not accessible’’ (Dawes et al. 2004).
Contextual (e.g., relevancy and
timeliness)
During the 9/11 response, only the police officers received relevant information on the
building collapse, while this information was valuable for firefighters and ambulance
personnel as well (9–11 Commission 2002).
‘‘Sending us very stale situation reports info that has already been updated (earlier) is
not as helpful. Is there a way to coordinate the info flow so we don’t waste time
receiving such old data and you folks don’t waste time sending us stuff?’’
(Christopher and Robert 2006).
Firefighters rushing to the Schiphol Detention Complex received outdated information
about the available gates to the area and were delayed in finding the right gate
(Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2006).
Intrinsic (e.g., correctness, consistency,
validity and completeness)
In the response to the 2004 Tsunami, ‘‘mostly, the information was incomplete, yet
conclusions were drawn immediately’’ (Samarajiva 2005).
‘‘During Katrina, the federal government lacked the timely, accurate, and relevant
ground-truth information necessary to evaluate which critical infrastructures were
damaged, inoperative, or both’’ (Townsend 2006).
Representational (e.g., amount of
information and format)
When a large-scale disaster happens, a great deal of information occurs in a short period
of time (Atoji et al. 2000), resulting in too much information to process (Jenvald et al.
2001) and straining the capacity of the emergency management and communication
systems (Manoj and Hubenko Baker 2007).
During 9/11, sometimes valuable information necessary for re-establishing normal
operations in non-emergency organizations had been kept only on paper, such as legal
files for cases in the process of litigation. This information was either destroyed or
made inaccessible due to the closure of buildings that needed thorough inspection or
repair before they could be re-occupied (Dawes et al. 2004).
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from the start and has been intensified because of the
demand for stability, transparency, and accountability in
the public sector.
3.2 Limitations and the need for adaptive information
coordination
Hierarchical coordination assumes that the environment is
predictable enough to characterize existing interdepen-
dencies and that predefined mechanisms can be designed
for various contingencies. While these conditions often
exist during non-disaster situations, extreme events will
lead to more uncertainty, a greater density of communi-
cation and the rate of decision-making increasing particular
at lower levels (Kapucu 2006). While hierarchical coordi-
nation, characterized by structural features such as stan-
dardization, specialization, and formalization, enable the
steady, efficient functioning of relief agencies in stable
(non-disaster) environments, they also severely limit the
flexibility public safety networks need to cope effectively
with complex, ambiguous, and unstable task environments
(cf. Adler et al. 1999). Weick (1990) postulates that system
and task complexities coupled with the need for immediate
local adjustments may preclude the possibility of sufficient
or timely direction from superior hierarchical positions. In
extreme environments, ‘‘we need to acknowledge that not
all relevant information is known, and that previously
known conditions may be in a state of flux’’ (Kapucu
2006). Moreover, each crisis is different which makes it
impossible to predict who will need which information
in advance. The ability to adapt to situations is often
the factor that makes things work, despite technical
constraints, dynamics of the task, and contextual factors
(Johansson and Hollnagel 2007). In the case that informa-
tion needs in the operational environment are unpredictable,
adaptability is necessary. We acknowledge that adaptability
is both multi-facetted and multi-dimensional, and limit our
focus to the ‘‘ability of the information coordination
architecture to supply the right information at the right time
in the right form to the right person, under changing
conditions’’.
Chakravarthy (1982) argues that the higher the level of
adaptation, the higher is the environmental complexity that
can be handled by the organization, or in this case, the
several disaster response teams. We embrace this argument
and illustrate its implications for information coordination
architectures in Fig. 1.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, highly adaptive information
coordination architectures can cope with more uncertainty
and thus, cover more information needs than non-adaptive
information architectures. We view adaptability as the
ability to permit changes in order to better share informa-
tion and meet the needs. We intentionally use the term
‘‘information need’’ instead of ‘‘information demand’’
since a relief worker may not demand information although
he or she can benefit from this information (for instance on
the collapse of a building).
From an organization science perspective, adaptation is
often the result of an ongoing negotiation between the
organization and its environment (March 1991). Corba-
cioglu and Kapucu (2006) analyzed the cultural, organi-
zational, and technical capacity of five response systems
and concluded that the availability of information, its
exchange, and its distribution within and among organi-
zational actors is critical for effective response. Using the
law of requisite variety Ashby (1958) pointed out that for a
given state of the environment, an open system has to be
able to respond to changes by adapting, otherwise the
ability of the system to survive is reduced. By not adapting
to the changing circumstances, an information system can














Fig. 1 The need for adaptive
information coordination
architectures
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become an obstacle, instead of an enabler, for effective
information coordination. Hence, this supports the argu-
ment that dealing with unpredictable environments and
information needs requires a high level of adaptability in
information coordination. Having discussed the limited
adaptability of hierarchical-based information coordination
architectures, the next section elaborates on the proposed
alternative of netcentric information coordination.
4 Netcentric information coordination in public safety
networks
4.1 Background on netcentricity
In the military, a more network oriented coordination
model has been advocated called ‘‘Network-Centric
Operations’’ or NCO. The term ‘‘Network-Centric Opera-
tions’’ (NCO) (also known as ‘‘Network-Centric Warfare’’)
comes from the U.S. Department of Defense and was first
coined by David Alberts, Art Cebrowski, and John Gartska
in a series of CCRP articles starting in 1996. Similar terms
have been introduced in other countries as well, including
Network Enabled Capability (NEC) in the United Kingdom
and Network Based Defense in Sweden. Acknowledging
several definitions that have been proposed for NCO (e.g.,
Van de Ven et al. 2008; Stanovich 2006), one definition
that captures it essentials is ‘‘military operations that
exploit state-of-the-art information and networking tech-
nology to integrate widely dispersed human decision
makers, situational and targeting sensors, and forces and
weapons into a highly adaptive, comprehensive system to
achieve unprecedented mission effectiveness’’, (Naval
Studies Board 2000). In theory, the small-unit soldier who
can access information and intelligence from all collection
sources will be able to employ combat assets such as air
support, artillery, and electronic warfare with much more
precision, timeliness, and effectiveness than what was
possible with past capabilities (Stanovich 2006). Netcen-
tricity emphasizes horizontal communications among peers
rather than vertical communications among commanders
and subordinates. In essence, NCO harnesses the autonomy
of individuals and seeks to empower the individuals (i.e.,
relief workers) in their ability to adapt to changing cir-
cumstances. A higher level of adaptability is assured by
leveraging the underling human and technical network capa-
bilities. Four tenets that comprise a description of the pur-
ported benefits of adopting NCO (Alberts et al. 2002) are:
• A robustly networked force improves information
sharing.
• Information sharing and collaboration enhance the
quality of information and shared situational awareness.
• Shared situational awareness enables self-synchroniza-
tion, and enhances sustainability and speed of command.
• These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness.
To these four tenets, Alberts (2002) adds that NCO
involves both: (1) the provision of vastly increased access
to information at all echelons and (2) the redefinition of the
relationships among participants in a mission and between
commanders and subordinates. NCO predicts a compres-
sion of the tactical, operational, and strategic echelons of
war and the need to operate seamlessly across organiza-
tional boundaries. The main capabilities necessary for
leveraging the purported benefits by NCO are decomposed
in three domains (Ibid)
1. Physical domain (technical implementation)
• All elements of the force are robustly networked
achieving secure and seamless connectivity.
2. Information domain
• Reachback: the force has the capability to collect,
share, access, and protect information.
• The force has the capability to collaborate in the
information domain, which enables a force to improve
its information position through processes of correla-
tion, fusion, and analysis.
• A force can achieve information advantage over an
adversary in the information domain.
3. Cognitive domain
• The force has the capability to develop and share high-
quality situational awareness.
• The force has the capability to develop a shared
knowledge of commander’s intent.
• The force has the capability to self-synchronize its
operations.
Until now, academic contributions regarding NCO are
scarce and the purported benefits have not yet been tested.
Moreover, metrics for evaluating the level of netcentricity
(i.e., zero netcentricity versus full netcentricity) are lack-
ing. Yet, relief agency managers are showing increasing
interest in the concepts behind NCO, particularly as
responders prepare for an increasingly complex threat
spectrum in a post-9/11 world (Stanovich 2006). Particu-
larly, the promise of the ‘‘four rights’’: the network supplies
the right information at the right time in the right form to
the right person attracts some interest in NCO. While we
acknowledge that the relief agencies in public safety net-
works deal with complex, hazardous, and highly unpre-
dictable events comparable to military missions, we need
to underline that the heterogeneity in public safety net-
works may be a hurdle when seeking to leverage the
advantages of NCO. Depending on the type and scale of a
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disaster, public safety networks consist of a variable set of
agencies, each employing their own information coordi-
nation procedures and technologies (Bharosa et al. 2010).
Considering the characteristics of public safety networks,
we express some concerns when adopting NCO as main
approach for configuring information coordination archi-
tectures in the next section.
4.2 Three major concerns regarding netcentric
information coordination in public safety networks
Barnett (1999) and later Groh (2006) have outlined some
major concerns regarding netcentricity in warfare, includ-
ing ‘‘ignoring the human dimension’’ and the ‘‘overem-
phasis on technology’’. For the domain of disaster
management, we postulate three major concerns that need
to be considered when (re)designing information coordi-
nation architectures in accordance with the netcentric
approach. First and foremost is the threat of information
overload that may overcome relief workers when they are
able to receive information from a large number of network
nodes (i.e., other relief workers and sensors). Here, infor-
mation overload refers to ‘‘a cascade of data that exceeds
the finite limits of information that can be processed and
acted upon by a human being in a stressful and complex
multi-tasking environment’’ (Stanovich 2006). In existing
hierarchical information architectures, information over-
load is mentioned as a problem for relief workers (e.g.,
Atoji et al. 2000; Jenvald et al. 2001; Manoj and Hubenko
Baker 2007). Yet, we are concerned that when having a far
larger number of nodes participate in the information
coordination process as dictated by netcentric coordination,
information overload may occur more often than is the case
with hierarchical coordination. A network of nodes is
generally incapable of deciding and semantically filtering
who needed what and when. In addition, when each indi-
vidual relief worker is allowed direct access to databases
(instead of querying information via the control room or
other agency), the tasks of discovering and filtering infor-
mation from a large dataset may even increase the time
needed to access relevant information. The change in dis-
traction created by peripheral and irrelevant information is
high and often has the effect of slowing the decision-
making process, as relief workers must process large
amounts of obfuscating and sometimes contradicting
information. Moreover, some nodes in the network may
actually reduce the overall quality of the information in the
network, for instance, when contributing information of
low quality (e.g., outdated, irrelevant, and incorrect).
Ultimately, information overload may not only delay the
relief worker in making timely and effective decisions, it
may also make it difficult for the relief worker to filter the
right, high-quality information from noise.
The second concern regarding netcentric information
coordination is the dilution of decision making and
responsibility boundaries (an advantage of hierarchical
coordination) when every relief worker has access to all
information in the network. This means that relief
agency commanders (strategic echelon) may interfere in
decisions and actions on the operational level of
response, just because the commanders think they know
what is happening on the field. As observed by Stano-
vich (2006), the availability of such a plethora of near-
real-time information often creates the false impression
among commanders that they have the same solid and
accurate grasp of conditions and situational awareness as
the local responders that deal with the incident at the
scene.
The third concern is that of bottom-up ‘‘freelancing’’,
something that is less problematic when subordinates
receive piecewise information (i.e., decisions and instruc-
tions), which is the case in hierarchical information coor-
dination. Freelancing is generally defined as ‘‘illegitimate
improvisation’’ that is not working toward the goals of
strategic level commanders (Mendonca et al. 2004). In this
context, freelancing due to available ‘‘big picture’’ or
shared situational overview can be considered as a devia-
tion from higher intent that is both unpredictable and
unexpected, and such activity presents serious problems to
a unified response effort.
4.3 The coordination dilemma: why can relief agencies
not just abandon hierarchical coordination?
Despite the purported advantages of the NCO approach
to coordination, relief agencies are not hastily to abandon
their hierarchical approach for coordination. One possible
explanation for this is that during non-crisis circum-
stances, relief agencies work autonomously and operate
as independent organizations with the need for tight
standards, long-linked process, and pooled information
sharing to ensure a clear division of responsibilities,
prompt decision processes, and timely action. Hierarchy
is used to establish control, specify tasks, allocate
responsibilities and reporting procedures, and presumably
gain reliability and efficiency in workflow. The standard
administrative approach to solving complex problems has
been to organize work involving multiple agents and
tasks hierarchically (Simon 1996). This approach works
reasonably well in routine circumstances when there is
time to plan actions, train personnel, identify problems,
and correct mistakes. Moreover, governments favor this
approach because it allows for high accountability, which
is important because the ‘‘blame game’’ after a disaster
requires politicians to pinpoint those who were respon-
sible (Boin et al. 2005).
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More reasons that relief agencies could have for not
adopting network-centric coordination lie in the far
reaching changes that need to be made on all levels of
response. Organizations that have adopted a netcentric
approach, such as the U.S. military or private companies
have struggled to modify hierarchical, control-oriented
approaches and to develop organizational structures that
are more horizontal and parallel (Alberts and Hayes
2003). Netcentric coordination assumes a high level of
uniformity and standardization on multiple levels of
response such as in the military, whereas this is often not
the case in the domain of multi-agency disaster response.
Relief agencies are both autonomous and heterogeneous
in their daily operations and serve different objectives.
Finally, the three concerns noted in the previous section
(information overload, responsibility dilution, and free-
lancing) underline that the concept of NCO still requires
further investigation. The NCO vision is out-of-sync with
the current organizational realities of public safety
networks.
Hierarchical coordination works fine for daily, routine
operations. However, under cumulative stress, hierarchi-
cal organizations tend to break down, and personnel are
hindered by a lack of information, constraints on inno-
vation, and an inability to shift resources and action to
meet new demands quickly (see also Comfort 1999).
NCO could substantially reduce information sharing time
and improve information access in public safety net-
works, only if the previously noted concerns are effec-
tively addressed. Therefore, any information disaster
information coordination system design should acknowl-
edge that centralized information sharing and coordina-
tion is essential for controlling and coordinating efforts
in accordance the intentions of decision-makers, while
decentralized information sharing and coordination is
necessary to adapt tasks in the context of local condi-
tions. While no single decision-maker can control the
detailed actions of such a large number of relief workers,
the alternative of allowing everyone in the network to
collect and disseminate information may be counterpro-
ductive in dealing with the disaster situation. Therefore,
what we need to know is what kind of hybrid approach
to information coordination could retain the strengths of
hierarchical and netcentric coordination, while attenuat-
ing the limitations of both. Much of previous research,
however, has treated both modes of coordination sepa-
rately or even as two extremes. Our observations from
field studies (Bharosa et al. 2010) have inspired us to
search for enhancements in the existing information
coordination architectures that may leverage the capa-
bilities required for assuring information quality. We
coin information orchestration as the concept that offers
the middle ground. This concept is discussed next.
5 Information orchestration: a hybrid approach
to information coordination
5.1 Elements of orchestration: boundary spanning
and mediation
Having elaborated upon two opposing information archi-
tectures in the previous sections, this section argues the
need for a hybrid approach to information coordination that
retains the strengths of hierarchical and netcentric coordi-
nation, while attenuating the limitations of both. We draw
on Faraj and Xiao (2006) who challenge much of the tra-
ditional approach to coordination and suggest that in set-
tings where work is contextualized and non-routine (e.g.,
disaster management), traditional models of coordination
are insufficient to explain coordination as it occurs in
practice. These authors give two conditions under which
the traditional coordination theory fails: when expertise is
distributed and work highly is contextualized, expertise
coordination is required to manage knowledge and skill
interdependencies. Also, when it is crucial to avoid error
under time pressure, fast-response cross-boundary coordi-
nation practices are needed. Both of these conditions apply
to disaster management. Hence, looking for a more
appropriate definition for coordination, Faraj and Xiao
(2006) define coordination as ‘‘a temporally unfolding and
contextualized process of input regulation and interaction
articulation to realize a collective performance’’. We argue
that this definition fits our study of the coordination of
information sharing during disasters. Disasters require
temporarily unfolding and contextualized coordination
mechanisms in which input and resources need to be reg-
ulated for high collective performance. Because relief
agencies are information intensive, it is just as important to
focus on the content of coordination (what is being coor-
dinated) as on the mode of coordination.
Traditional coordination theory emphasizes the how
(i.e., the mode) of coordination as opposed to the what
(content) and when (circumstances) of coordination
(Thompson 1967). This distinction becomes increasingly
important in complex and dynamic environments where
there is less reliance on formal structure, interdependencies
are changing, and work is primarily performed in hetero-
geneous teams. Scholars such as Powell (1990); Clemons
et al. (1993) have studied ways to coordinate organizations
other than hierarchies and have also emphasized the need
for inter-organizational information sharing, especially in
the network form of coordination. Moreover, they have
discussed the possibilities for hybrid forms of coordination
that are suited for dealing with different conditions. We
draw upon this idea, especially since information technol-
ogy has evolved in such a way that it can support indi-
viduals or groups can coordinate information sharing
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beyond organizational boundaries (Lindgren et al. 2008). It
is because of this evolution that we propose the concept of
information orchestration.
The concept of orchestration is not entirely new as it
has been studied in other domains such as e-government
(Janssen et al. 2006), value chains (Hinterhuber 2002),
and business networks (Busquets 2010). Accordingly,
multiple types of orchestrators have been proposed
including the workflow, process, information, and net-
work orchestrators. Due to the high level of specialization
and distribution of work during disaster management,
relief agencies are fragmented by multiple functional,
geographical, hierarchical, and professional boundaries.
In such contexts, orchestrators are necessary for the
coordination of information flows between multiple
agencies. Orchestration is often described as a heterar-
chical, information technology enabled, coordination of
information sharing performed by boundary spanners
with a specific set of capabilities called similar to medi-
ators (Wiederhold and Genesereth 1997) or brokers
(Miles and Snow 1986). The term ‘‘heterarchical’’ is used
because there is no hierarchy of processors (active units).
Heterarchical control structures have distributed locally
autonomous entities that communicate with other entities
without the master/slave relationship found in a hierar-
chical architecture. According to Dilts et al. (1991), the
field of distributed computing is a source for a number of
justifications for the principles of heterarchical control
architectures.
Orchestration is performed by so-called boundary
spanners, i.e., individuals who operate at the periphery or
boundary of an organization, relating the organization with
elements outside it. On a general level, boundary spanning
can be seen as the activity of making sense of peripheral
information that is perceived relevant to expand the
knowledge at the center of a given organizational context
(Lindgren et al. 2008). The difference with the traditional
form of boundary spanning lies in the high reachback (wide
accessibility and geographical reach of the information
technology used). As such, orchestration is an information
coordination activity aimed at linking new, typically
environment-related information to prior knowledge for
gaining situational awareness. Essentially, these individu-
als scan the environment for new information, attempting
to determine its relevance vis-a`-vis information already
assimilated in the organization. In this boundary-spanning
process, the individual, the organization, and the environ-
ment are parts of a network of interactions and organiza-
tional knowledge creation (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).
Boundary spanners need to be connected to most of the
disaster management network members for high centrality
in the network. This level of connectivity is enabled by
information technology. As a result of this centrality, they
will enjoy positive resource asymmetries (Gnyawali and
Madhavan 2001). Based on the theory of structural holes
(Burt 1992), the orchestrator bridges the structural holes
(gaps in information flows) that exist between multiple
relief agencies. By filling the existing structural holes, or-
chestrators enhance their control of the information that
flows between relief agencies and hence can accrue infor-
mation benefits (Gnyawali and Madhavan 2001). For
instance, the orchestrator may have access to information
about the resources and capabilities of the police depart-
ment, or the information needs of fire department.
According to Tushman (1977), such information gathering
and assimilation is associated with specific boundary-
spanning roles at different stages in the innovation process.
This allows for the fulfillment of functions beyond that of
storage, integration, and brokering. A public safety net-
work can have multiple information orchestrators on dif-
ferent levels. Each orchestrator can fulfill one or more
functions. Some proposed functions for information
orchestration include coordination of information, infor-
mation inventory, and interoperation of information ser-
vices (Janssen and van Veenstra 2005).
5.2 A framework for information orchestration
capabilities
We define information orchestration as a heterarchical
form of coordination supported by a specific set of roles
and capabilities related to the collection, enrichment, and
sharing of high-quality information. Until now, academic
contributions on how to design orchestrators are sparse.
Directions can be identified based on the necessary capa-
bilities for adaptation, as provided by the contribution of
Gosain et al. (2005). Drawing on their contribution, we
conceptualize information orchestration as a set of two
arrangements that need to be implemented for adaptive
information coordination: advance structuring and dynamic
adjustment. Each of these arrangements leverages offen-
sive (preemptive and exploitative) and defensive (protec-
tive and corrective) capabilities.
Advance structuring refers to a priori structuring of
inter-organizational information flows and inter-connected
processes, such that relief agencies can reduce the effort
involved in adjusting to the changing task environment. As
relief workers do not have to collaborate and share infor-
mation during routine, non-disaster situations, there is
often only a weak relationship between such agencies.
Advanced structuring requires long-term relationship
building amongst relief agencies prior to and during a
disaster. Advance structuring needs to leverage preemptive
and protective capabilities for structuring inter-organiza-
tional information flows for instance by reducing task
interdependence through loose coupling (Tan and Sia
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2006), or mitigating resource dependency by diversifying
resource allocations (i.e., creating alternative information
sources). Loose coupling reduces the need to coordinate
information exchange and flow in a dyadic relationship,
while dependency diversification generates alternative
options to mitigate overdependence on critical resources.
Such capabilities should result in higher adaptability. From
an information architecture perspective information,
orchestration requires an extra layer is inserted the client
and the server (Wiederhold and Genesereth 1997). Exam-
ples of capabilities that can be leveraged trough advance
structuring include reachback (the ability to access
resources that are not locally available) and caching (the
ability to freeze data entry modules in applications so that
information need not to be lost during (temporary) infra-
structure failure.
Complementary to advance structuring, dynamic adjust-
ment involves real-time reconfiguration of inter-organiza-
tional information sharing processes and resources in
accordance with the changed disaster environment. The
primary theoretical basis for dynamic adjustment is the
learning-based sense and adapt paradigm (Haeckel 1995).
Sambamurthy et al. (2003) suggest that dynamic adjustment
is achieved by enhancing feedback in a changing environ-
ment through sensing and adapting making it a two-pole
strategy. In sensing capability, IT-supported orchestrators
become more informed and forward-looking, and have more
time to adapt, through feedback, quick learning, and con-
stant environmental scanning. Examples of capabilities that
can be leveraged trough dynamic adjustment include pro-
active sensing (ability to anticipate information needs) and
quality feedback (ability to rate the quality of information
shared). The following framework captures both sets of
arrangements and the necessary capabilities necessary for
adaptability and IQ assurance.
According to Fig. 2, advance structuring and dynamic
adjustment require four set of capabilities for assuring
adaptive information sharing and coordination. We argue
that information orchestration will allow subordinate relief
agencies to adjust and adapt quickly and easily to deal with
changing situations or unforeseen events and circum-
stances. If the proposed capabilities are leveraged,
information orchestration can retain the strengths (defined
command relationships, efficiency, and control) of a
bureaucratic hierarchy, enabling preplanning in the more
predictable aspects of disaster response, yet also permit the
adaptability needed to fulfill information needs during
dynamic and unstable disaster situations.
5.3 Capabilities needed for information quality
assurance
According to the information-processing paradigm (Gal-
braith 1973), each coordination (i.e., orchestration) mech-
anism needs to be endowed with a specific information-
processing capability and must be matched to the infor-
mation-processing demands of the environment or needs
generated by the interdependence of work units. In order to
deal with the characteristics of a disaster, information or-
chestrators need to have a range of capabilities in order to
adapt and assure IQ. Moreover, one information orches-
trator would not be able to coordinate all the possible
information flows in a disaster management network. The
exact number of information orchestrators depends on
several contingencies. Several information orchestrators
may be required for any given disaster situation. A capa-
bility is a set of specific an identifiable processes (Eisen-
hardt and Martin 2000). These capabilities will allow the
orchestrator to adaptively match information demand and
supply in accordance with the situation at hand. Depending
on these capabilities, orchestrators can have a reactive or
proactive role in the information-sharing process. For
instance, dealing with trusted orchestrators may encourage
database owners to participate in information sharing to a
greater extent than they would if all participants would
need to be granted file-level access privileges. In this way,
the hurdles of security and privacy can be addressed. The
following table summarizes the necessary capabilities for
an information orchestrator in public safety networks.
We postulate that information architectures for assuring
high information quality need to realize information
orchestration capabilities shown in Table 2. The capabili-
ties will enhance adaptability in a number of ways. For
instance, the capability to compose new web services on
During a 
disaster 
Protective capabilities (e.g., 
dependency diversification, 
caching and freezing)  
Exploitative capabilities 
(e.g., proactive sensing, 
event notification) 
Corrective capabilities (e.g., 







(e.g., shared info space, 
reachback) 
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the fly will allow information orchestrators to quickly adapt
their application service portfolio to new information
needs. In addition, the capability to simulate and extrapo-
late events will allow orchestrators to predict emerging
information demands, again allowing for adaptation of the
service portfolio. Domain specialization avoids the ten-
dency to have committees and their compromises drive
software specification. The information-processing tasks of
orchestrators include accessing of appropriate resources,
data selection, format conversion, bringing data to common
abstraction levels, matching and integration of information
from distinct sources, and preparing information and
descriptive meta-information for relief worker customer’s
workstations, including focusing, filtering, and summariz-
ing. The general objective is to match the demand for
information as much as possible and in accordance with the
situational circumstances (e.g., if a building will collapse
and the relief worker does not know this, this information
should be pushed to the relief worker regardless of the
demand, whether or not the relief worker demanded this
information explicitly). Ultimately, information orchestra-
tors must understand what information is pertinent, what is
peripheral, and what is extraneous. They also must deter-
mine what agencies are the most reliable sources (for
Table 2 Capabilities needed for assuring information quality in public safety networks
Necessary capability Type Example Targeted hurdles
Quality auditing Preemptive Information quality checks across several
relief agencies and governmental
agencies.
Incorrect and outdated information in
agency data sources.
Boundary spanning Corrective Integrate demand and supply across
different agencies for specific
information objects (need to now, have
to know etc).
Trust and security, the autonomy of
agencies, bridging interdependencies.
Information libraries Preemptive Define library containing information
based on the experience from previous
disasters together with some field
experts. Uncertainties within a domain
may be captured by a formal model.
Rapid access to knows, information that is
already available somewhere is being
searched for somewhere else,
uncertainty.
Web-service composition Corrective Rapid composition of new information
web service in order to accommodate
new information need.
Dealing with unknowns or unprecedented
information needs.
Enrichment Corrective For instance completing and updating of
situation reports.
Incomplete or inaccurate information.
Anticipation (e.g., via simulation) Exploitative Extrapolation and prediction of the event/
risk variables in order to anticipate
information needs. Anticipate what may
happen and which reaction would be
appropriate (Rosen 1985). The next
time we encounter A (or a circumstance
similar to A), we will be prepared, and
more likely to react adequately.
The simple ordering of options according
to the probability that they would be
relevant immensely decreases the
complexity of decision-making, since
we would only need to pay attention to
the most relevant circumstances.
Information categorization Protective Define the relevancy level of information
(e.g., need to know for all, police only,
nice to know etc.).
Information over or under load.
Expertise gathering and consultation Corrective Keep and maintain a list of experts on
specific information classes and call
upon their services when needed or
errors in data or knowledge need to be
identified.
Validation of information and availability
of tacit information.
Reachback Preemptive Maximize the ability to access
information resources that are not
locally available (e.g., building
structures, ship container content info).
Information availability, response time.
Information quality feedback/tagging Exploitative Add meta-data to existing information
about the source, relevancy,
completeness and timelines. The meta-
data should indicate the quality level of
the information.
Knowing about the quality of information
(based on the tags) relief workers can
decide themselves if they will act upon
the information or wait for/request
updated/enriched information.
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instance based on their respective reputations), and how
those agencies can provide that information, when it is
needed, and in the format required. The following table
positions information orchestration to the previously dis-
cussed coordination approaches.
Table 3 presents the differences between the three
main coordination approaches we discussed in this
paper, where information orchestration is aimed at taking
leveraging the advantages hierarchical coordination (e.g.,
clear authority structure, standardization, specialization,
and formalization), and network approaches (e.g., reach-
back, adaptability, and self-synchronization). Compared
with the hierarchical form of information coordination,
netcentric coordination, and information orchestration are
not studied much and pose interesting questions for fur-
ther research. We discuss some of these questions in the
next section.
6 A research agenda for IQ assurance in public safety
networks
Policy makers and information system architects in public
safety networks face a dilemma. During normal/non-crisis
situations, there exist a need for tight structuring, formal
coordination, and top-down decision-making to ensure a
clear division of responsibilities, formalized procedures,
and accountability. While these characteristics can be
considered as the advantages of hierarchical coordination,
during a disaster situation, there is a competing need to rely
on network-centric structures, including adaptive informa-
tion flows, network wide information access (reachback),
and ad hoc information sharing. While network-based
coordination promises some major benefits compared to
hierarchical approaches (e.g., higher adaptability, faster
information sharing, and shared situational awareness), we
see that the realization of such approaches in practice is still
missing. Reasons for this include the major technical,
organizational, and training investments needed to leverage
the promised benefits of netcentricity. Much of previous
research, however, has treated both modes of coordination
separately or even as two extremes. In the meantime, poor
IQ seems to be a recurring issue during disaster response
efforts. Therefore, this article underlines need for a hybrid
approach to information coordination that retains the
strengths of hierarchical and netcentric coordination, while
attenuating the limitations of both.
Our observations from field studies (Bharosa et al. 2010)
have inspired us to search for minor enhancements in the
existing, hierarchical information coordination architec-
tures that may leverage the capabilities required for
assuring information quality. We propose information
orchestration such as set of minor enhancements to existing
information coordination architectures that needs to put on
the research agenda on assuring IQ in public safety net-
works. With information orchestration, the ability to adapt
can be leveraged by designing preemptive and protective
arrangements (advance structuring) together with exploit-
ative and corrective arrangements (dynamic adjustment).
We argue that given the current state of information
Table 3 Comparison between three coordination approaches
Traditional approaches Information orchestration NCO
Main coordination form Hierarchical coordination Heterarchical coordination Netcentric coordination
Roles One or multiple predefined
individuals or groups
Role and specific information
sharing and coordination
Network, everyone can push, pull,
and process information
Information flows Follows the hierarchical chain of
command (grip levels)
Situation and need driven
dissemination
Widespread dissemination
Network configuration Hub and spoke, publish and
subscribe
Smart pull and smart push,
information posting
Relational
Interdependencies Pooled Sequential Reciprocal
Triggers Input/output, procedures Events and demand Events
Coordination principles Coordination by standards plan,
routines, meetings.
Advanced structuring (e.g., access





Information sources Agency specific, intra- agency
systems
Variety of information sources,
inter-agency data access
All possible sources need to be
accessible
Service portfolio Application depended, static, fixed On the fly service composition Actor/agency specific





Coupling of elements Tight Tight with slack Loose
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technology and the complexity of the tasks during disas-
ters, relief workers should not be burdened with the task of
seeking out information sources and disseminating infor-
mation in the network. This task of finding structured or
unstructured information is best left to an information
orchestrator which interacts with information services of
various agencies and takes care of the information needs
that go beyond the boundary of a single agency. In doing
so, such an orchestrator requires capabilities to prioritize,
find, combine and evaluate information, and share it with
the parties for whom it may be important.
The concept of orchestration and its implications for
information coordination during disaster management is
not fully crystallized yet and provides directions for further
research. The research agenda contains several ill-studied
issues, challenging researchers with several backgrounds
(i.e., technical, social, and organizational). Research needs
to focus on the specification, realization, and evaluation of
hybrid information coordination approach such as infor-
mation orchestration. The exact form and configuration of
information orchestrators in all echelons of public safety
networks is still unclear. Important research questions that
need to be addressed in further research include: how much
of the coordination problem is within agencies, how much
across, and to what degree are the two interrelated? Which
information categories and flows should be orchestrated?
How do a team of orchestrators work together coherently?
The set of capabilities discussed in our information
orchestration framework can help focusing on the devel-
opment of technical functionalities, roles, and procedures
that are needed to assure IQ.
Considering this research agenda stating what we need
to know, some directions are also provided on how we
need to get there. We argue that scholars need to conduct
more field studies on disaster management efforts. As field
studies provide rich but abstract data, scholars should aim
to triangulate the findings of multiple data collection
instruments. For instance, the observation of disaster
response exercises and immediate surveying of relief
workers after the exercise can be very useful in the data
collection process, especially if data is conducted in a
longitudinal fashion. This approach to data collection
would require closer collaboration between the scholars
and the organizers of disaster management exercises.
Moreover, in our experience, scholars need to collaborate
with exercise organizers in order to obtain data via dif-
ferent channels and log information system use, an
opportunity that is often missed as organizers do not see
the need for collecting exercise data. The collected data
from field studies could help academics in pinpointing
information sharing and coordination bottlenecks, which
in turn are necessary for the further development and
prototyping of information orchestrators and their
embedding in information coordination architectures.
Finally, quasi-experimentation, for instance using inter-
active gaming sessions with real relief workers, holds
potential value for testing and fine-tuning the roles and
capabilities of orchestrators together their contribution to
addressing IQ issues.
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